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I. INTRODUCTION
Both administrative law traditionalists and modem evidence law
commentators have criticized technical evidence law principles, par-
ticularly the hearsay rule. Much of the criticism relates to the concern
that hearsay rule application could, and does, unjustly exclude signifi-
cant amounts of relevant proofs. These critics have largely signaled
their desire for hearsay rule modification, repeal, or nonuse. 1
Early advocates of the administrative law process 2 suggested that
the hearsay rule be completely excluded from administrative law ap-
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1. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis
of Hearsay, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 723 (1992) (proposing courts should admit hearsay
if it is more probative than prejudicial, but permit the party opposing the hearsay
to keep such hearsay out if that party produces the declarant at trial); Roger
Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv. 51 (1987)
(advocating liberalized hearsay rules in the civil, but not criminal, context); Elea-
nor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. 495 (1987) (recognizing
relevant, non-prejudicial hearsay statements should be admitted, but only where
the hearsay proponent can provide evidence of the declarant's testimonial quali-
ties by way of foundation witnesses and only where the admission of hearsay
statements would not work to shift the burden of proof to the opposing party).
2. For a general discussion of the circumstances in which an administrative hearing
may be required, and the procedural protections that must be offered during such
a hearing, see Frederick Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The
Trial-Type Hearing and the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 DuKE
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plication. These commentators were concerned that the hearsay rule
would disrupt the administrative law process and cause much delay in
its principle task of securing efficient and just dispositions for the
claimant. 3 Many of these same commentators were likewise con-
cerned that a disproportionate amount of administrative time would
be spent deciphering and resolving hearsay rule challenges. 4 Thus,
early proponents of the administrative law process rejected entirely
hearsay rule application to administrative hearings.
Modern evidence commentators continue to challenge the hearsay
rule in general jurisdiction trials. Because framers of modern evi-
dence codes remain committed to common-law principles, evidence
rules of today, like the Federal Rules of Evidence, retain much of the
underlying common-law theories of development, including the hear-
say rule.5 However, these framers recognized the practical need for
expanded use of hearsay evidence proofs. Modern codes of evidence
have expanded the common-law categories of hearsay exceptions6
while simultaneously restricting, somewhat, the common-law defini-
tion of hearsay.7 The effect of such modern codification changes is to
give the litigator of today freer use of hearsay proofs.
Irrespective of these modern code revisions, many evidence com-
mentators continue to criticize hearsay rule application in general ju-
risdiction courts.8 Their criticism significantly relates to continued
doubts as to the underlying reliability of select common-law developed
exceptions. Much of their concern centers on the notion that many of
the categorical exceptions, such as the excited utterance, dying decla-
ration, and declaration against interest, were historically supported
by general common-law claims of reliability, which if today were sub-
ject to empirical social studies challenge would hardly find renewed
reliability.9 The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were aware
L.J. 389, 393-400, and Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law: The Third Cen-
tury, 29 ADMiN. L. REv. 291, 299-309 (1977).
3. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 689 (1964); Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal
Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 12-17.
4. See Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 14-15.
5. See FED. R. EVID. 802; see also FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee's intro-
ductory note.
6. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807.
7. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
8. See Friedman, supra note 1; Park, supra note 1, Swift, supra note 1.
9. See Ronald J. Allen, Commentary on Professor Friedman's Article: The Evolution
of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MmN. L. REv. 797, 801 (1992)
(noting "the complete lack in the literature for over twenty years of any effort to
provide a justification for the hearsay exceptions"); cf. Stephan Landsman &
Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning
the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv.
65 (1991) (suggesting preliminary empirical data indicates the basic premise for
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of such criticism, but remained committed to common-law principles,
and thus acknowledged many of these subject categories of
exception.1 0
Many evidence commentators of today remain concerned that the
hearsay rule, albeit reformed, continues to exclude significant rele-
vant proofs, thereby compromising the truth finding process. This ar-
gument presupposes the fact that there are no virtues for the
American trial other than truth finding. This contention is false. In
our system of justice there are many important principles for the ex-
clusion of relevant evidence which similarly impact on claims of truth.
Character evidence rules,"- privileged communication principles,12
and authentication requirements1 3 are among the many exclusionary
rules that both general jurisdiction courts and the administrative law
tribunals recognize. Though many advocates have taken issue with
the hearsay rule, these advocates have never advanced the thought
that these diverse evidence rules should be abandoned because of
their respective impact on the truth finding process. It is a widely
accepted principle of Anglo-American law that not all relevant evi-
dence is admissible. Given that the American trial system is designed
to promote both truth and justice, evidentiary rules that exclude po-
tentially relevant evidence should not find rejection.
Administrative law traditionalists were well aware of these com-
plex arguments against using the hearsay rule. They resolved such
disputes by advocating that the hearsay rule be excluded from the ad-
ministrative law process. Perhaps this over-reaction led to the admis-
sion of problematic proofs to the argued detriment of the
administrative law process.
The often heard justifications for allowing hearsay proofs in the
administrative law process relate (1) to the acknowledged absence of
lay jury triers of fact and (2) to claims that the administrative law
judge is uniquely qualified to resolve complex issues of fact and law.
These arguments are makeweight.
Early proponents of the administrative law process were convinced
that the absence of a jury was reason enough to exclude hearsay rule
application from agency adjudication.1 4 Though historically the hear-
the exclusion of hearsay, that jurors are incompetent to effectively evaluate hear-
say, is incorrect).
10. See FED. R. EvID. 803, 804, 807.
11. See FED. R. Evin. 404.
12. See FED. R. Evm. 501.
13. See FED. R. EviD. 901.
14. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure argued "[tihe
absence ofajury and the technical subject-matter with which agencies often deal,
all weigh heavily against a requirement that administrative agencies observe
what is known as the 'common law rules' of evidence for jury trials." COMMIrEE
ON ADMIN. PROc., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNmENT AGENCIES, S. Doc.
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say rule was inspired by the jury system in general jurisdiction mat-
ters, application of the modern hearsay rule is not reserved to jury
trials. The Federal Rules of Evidence make no distinction between
bench and jury trial for hearsay rule use.
Allowing administrative law judges to ignore judicial rules of evi-
dence because of their claimed expertise cannot be justified either.
Our nation's general jurisdiction judges, who likewise deal with so-
phisticated issues and are singularly knowledgeable about trial
processes, are bound by the institutional rules of evidence, generally
without exception. The Federal Rules of Evidence were designed to
limit judicial power over the admission of evidence without resort to
whether or not the fact finder was a jury or judge. The claim that
subject matter sophistication should control standards of evidence
credibility review is most problematic. Indeed, some courts and stat-
utes require administrative law judges to comply with judicial rules of
evidence to ensure the fairness of administrative proceedings. 15
Consistent with administrative law tradition, Congress enacted
the Administrative Procedure Act.16 This legislation rejected com-
mon-law technical application of the Rules of Evidence, including the
hearsay rule. Though the Administrative Procedure Act retained cer-
tain general limits on the admission of evidence, such as relevance,
materiality, and avoidance of unduly repetitious proofs, the hearsay
rule remained inoperative in administrative law proceedings. 17
No. 77-8, at 70 (1941), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES 70 (Charles I. Woltz ed., 1968).
15. See Johnson v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 546 So. 2d 741
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Eastman v. Department of Public Aid, 534 N.E.2d 458
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Kade v. Charles H. Hickey Sch., 566 A.2d 148 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1989); Sims v. Baer, 732 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Anaya v. New
Mexico State Personnel Bd., 762 P.2d 909, 913-15 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); Philadel-
phia Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
565 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
In 1947, the United States Congress enacted the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, which amended the National Labor Relations Act to provide that Na-
tional Labor Relations Board hearings should be conducted in accordance with
federal evidence law then in effect in nonjury litigation. See Labor-Management
Relations Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 10(b), 61 Stat. 136, 146-47 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1994)). Similarly, the United States Department
of Labor, for its administrative hearings, adopted a set of evidence rules similar
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, including the hearsay rule, with modification.
These rules include a liberal application of the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.801-.806 (1997).
16. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
17. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 7(c), 60 Stat. 237, 241 (1946) (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994)); see also BERNARD ScmvARTZ, ADMIN-
IsTRATIVE LAw § 7.2, at 371-73 (3d ed. 1991).
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II. RESOLVED-THE MODERN HEARSAY RULE SHOULD
FIND APPLICATION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW PROCESS
Administrative adjudication today, in reality, appear functionally
equivalent to federal and state civil nonjury trials. These nonjury tri-
als do apply strict hearsay evidence rules where appropriate. It fol-
lows, then, that such evidentiary holdings should apply to
administrative adjudications as well.is The need for judicial rules of
evidence, more particularly the application of the hearsay rule, is
more urgent in administrative proceedings than it is under general
jurisdiction settings. This is so because lay commissioners often re-
view the evidence record in administrative proceedings. A lay admin-
istrative commissioner often is unfamiliar with technical evidence
rules, and therefore might give disproportionate deference to a prob-
lematic administrative hearing record, leading to an unfair disposi-
tion. Application of the theories of evidence law, including the
hearsay rule, would perhaps reduce the potential for such unfair
results.
Though courts have historically adhered to administrative restric-
tions on hearsay rule application,1 9 they have continually noted the
credibility risks inherent in the admission of hearsay proofs.20 This
concern resulted in the judicial formulation of the residuum rule, as
applied in administrative proceedings.
The residuum rule allows the admission of hearsay proofs,
whatever their format and irrespective of their credibility traits, but
restricts its dispositive use unless other nonhearsay evidence exists on
the administrative record.2i Adherence to the residuum rule requires
18. See Michael H. Graham, The Case for Model Rules of Evidence in Administrative
Adjudications, 38 FED. B. NEws & J. 189, 189 (1991) (arguing rules of evidence
modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply in administrative
adjudications).
19. See Hancock v. State Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 758 P.2d 1372, 1377
(Colo. 1988) (noting reliable, trustworthy hearsay evidence can be used to estab-
lish an element in a driver's license revocation proceeding, although not reaching
the issue because the appellant failed to raise a hearsay objection at the adminis-
trative hearing); Wright v. Department of Educ., Div. of Blind Servs., 523 So. 2d
681, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (applying administrative evidence rule that
permits hearsay evidence to supplement or explain other evidence, but that only
permits hearsay evidence to support an administrative finding if it would be ad-
missible under a hearsay exception in a civil action).
20. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402, 407 (1971) (admitting hearsay
evidence in the form of medical reports, but noting the absence of live testimony
and cross-examination).
21. See Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507, 509 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that,
although hearsay evidence may be admitted in a workers' compensation hearing,




the reversal of an administrative finding if it is uniquely based on
hearsay proofs.2 2 The residuum rule is a clear over-reaction to the use
of hearsay proofs. As applied, the residuum rule does not test the reli-
ability of any given hearsay proof to sustain an administrative finding;
rather, the residuum rule requires additional corroborative evidence
to the hearsay to sustain an administrative finding.
Perhaps the residuum rule had its moorings in the acknowledg-
ment that though the hearsay rule was thought too complex and ineffi-
cient for administrative law proceedings, the evils that the hearsay
rule sought to mitigate, such as witness unreliability and insincerity,
tested by the traditional safeguards of witness cross-examination,
oath affirmation, or demeanor review, were similarly present in ad-
ministrative proceedings.
The residuum rule was never intended to be an evidentiary rule of
exclusion; instead, it was a rule to invite additional proofs having in-
dependent grounds of reliability. Proponents of the administrative
law process sought comfort in suggesting total rejection of hearsay
rule exclusion because of its complexities, while assuring themselves
that dispositions would remain fair by relying on corroborative proofs.
The residuum rule is not a satisfactory substitute for the exclusion
of all hearsay proofs. Instead, a liberal reading of the modern hearsay
rule and its defined exceptions and exclusions would better satisfy
credibility critics while preserving and promoting the idealism behind
the administrative law process.
Though the residuum rule has been significantly criticized, the
rule is followed in many state jurisdictions.23 This is not the case,
however, under federal administrative law. The United States
Supreme Court in Richardson v. Perales2 4 modified the residuum rule.
This modification recognized the historic notion that certain hearsay
declarations by virtue of the circumstances of their utterance have
unique properties of reliability, and that because of their reliability,
such hearsay proofs can be the basis of administrative decisions.
In Richardson, a party challenged the admissibility and dispositive
use of physician reports offered by the government to defeat the merits
of a social security disability claim. The government advanced these
reports as dispositive proof of the non-meritorious claim. Although
the proffered reports were hearsay by definition, the court affirmed
the administrative law judge's admission and dispositive use of these
reports. In so holding, the Richardson Court rejected the purity of the
residuum rule and allowed the physician reports to be admitted based
22. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938) (noting NLRB
board decisions must be supported by substantial evidence, and "[m] ere uncorrob-
orated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence").
23. See ScHwARTz, supra note 17, § 7.4, at 377.
24. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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on their common-law reliability and fairness. The Richardson Court
noted that "courts have recognized the reliability and probative worth
of written medical reports even in formal trials and, while acknowl-
edging their hearsay character, have admitted them as an exception to
the hearsay rule."25
The Richardson analysis parallels modern evidence rule use in
contested proceedings. The residuum rule as practiced sought to
achieve administrative awards based on substantial evidence. Given
the development of the modern hearsay rule, this goal can readily be
obtained by relying on modern evidence codes and their developed
hearsay exceptions to admit dispositive proofs in contested agency
matters.26
Administrative law tradition continues to reject technical compli-
ance in applying the hearsay rule. This is due in large measure to the
claim that hearsay rule application only disrupts the administrative
process. Though modem courts continue to cite these normative
framed restrictions, decisional trends in administrative law suggest a
willingness to freely recognize hearsay rule application. 27 Their will-
ingness to interject classic evidentiary theory, particularly the hear-
say rule, into contested administrative proceedings bespeaks a desire
to ensure institutional fairness of the proceeding. Courts that have
reviewed these issues are convinced that the threshold principles of
evidence reliability, as represented by the hearsay rule, constitute the
core value of our judicial system.28
The hearsay rule of today is'a necessary mechanism to test the
threshold reliability of proffered evidence, regardless of the forum. To
the extent that the administrative law process focuses on flexibility
and fairness, select application of the hearsay rule promotes respect
for this very process. All too often proponents of the administrative
law process fail to recognize that the hearsay rule is not merely an
evidence technicality, but is a fundamental principle that preserves
25. Id. at 405.
26. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 402 P.2d 414, 418 (Ariz. 1965)
(upholding an administrative decision based in part on evidence fitting the mod-
em hearsay exceptions for statements describing an existing physical condition,
statements to a physician, and medical records).
27. See Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 658 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1983); Snel-
grove v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 240 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987);
State ex rel. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 276 v. Department of Educ., 256 N.W.2d 619
(Minn. 1977).
28. See Colorado Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16, 22 (Colo.
1987) (noting hearsay evidence may support an administrative ruling '[als long
as the hearsay is reliable and trustworthy and possesses probative value com-
monly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons"); Wright v. Department of
Educ., Div. of Blind Servs., 523 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1988) (holding




and protects adversarial due process: "The hearsay rule is not a tech-
nical rule of evidence, but a basic, vital and fundamental rule of law
which ought to be followed by administrative agencies at those points
in their hearings when facts crucial to the issue are sought to be
placed upon the record."2 9
The hearsay rule articulates standards of relevance, credibility,
and fairness, which the adversarial process demands regardless of the
forum. Modern administrative law litigators acknowledge these prin-
ciples and often invoke technical rules of evidence, hoping to direct the
administrative law judge toward predetermined patterns of
fairness. 30
The hearsay rule began as the foremost technical symbol of evi-
dence exclusion. The inherent unfairness in admitting hearsay decla-
rations in the absence of cross-examination opportunities, oath
administration, and demeanor review at time of declaration led to the
common-law development of the modern hearsay rule. Today, cross-
examination, oath, and demeanor review are the principal mecha-
nisms to evaluate witness credibility, be it before the bench, jury, or in
administrative proceedings.31
Administrative law proponents often argue that hearsay evidence
is admissible with or without objection, and that such evidence may
uniquely support an administrative decision.3 2 This position is indis-
tinguishable from general jurisdiction court practice. Courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction have welcomed the admission of hearsay proofs,
provided that such evidence has degrees of reliability either rooted in
the common law or developed under modern code provisions. 33 The
distinguishing factor is that the proponents of the administrative pro-
cess suggest that hearsay evidence, per se, be admissible regardless of
its circumstances of declaration. This is most problematic given the
fact that the only limit to the admissibility of hearsay proofs in admin-
istrative law proceedings is that such proofs be relevant, material, and
not unduly repetitive.3 4 To merely admit, at will, hearsay proofs in an
administrative proceeding, without requiring the proponents to
29. Bleilevens v. Commonwealth State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 A-2d 109, 111 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973).
30. See Whitlow v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 56 Cal. Rptr. 525, 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(noting hearsay objections were raised at an administrative hearing, but uphold-
ing the hearing officer's decision that such objections went to the weight, not the
admissibility, of the evidence).
31. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
32. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Adminis-
trative Process, 55 HARv. L. REV. 364, 374-76 (1942).
33. See Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by
Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1992).
34. See Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1980).
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demonstrate the proofs' credibility, either by relying on a common-law
rooted category of acceptance or offering independent foundation
proofs of accuracy surrounding the circumstances of such declarations,
calls into question the inherent sincerity of such a proceeding.3 5
The administrative debate over the use of technical evidence rules,
particularly the hearsay rule, is overly expansive. Typically, these ar-
guments do not distinguish between rule-making proceedings and in-
formal adversarial adjudication.3 6 The latter proceeding remains
similar in scope to a general jurisdiction trial. Here, the purpose for
such a hearing or trial is to resolve actual disputes regarding the
rights of individuals or institutions. It is this forum of adversarial ad-
judication that best reflects the need for hearsay rule application, de-
spite traditional claims to the contrary. Given that the hearsay rule
provides the necessary challenge to problematic proofs, the impor-
tance of its role in preserving justice should not be singled out for
unique application to general jurisdiction forums.
Administrative law traditionalists commonly argue that the appli-
cation of the hearsay rule disrupts the administrative process by re-
quiring inefficient evidence challenges. They often suggest that it
takes longer to argue and resolve a request for an exclusionary ruling
under the matrix of the hearsay rule than it does to listen to the evi-
dence as initially presented.37 All too often, administrative law judges
are by necessity required to analyze and weigh problematic proofs.
Though high-volume adjudication may invite the rejection of technical
evidence law application, the conflict between efficiency aspirations
and credibility reviews should not be compromised at the expense of
legitimate evidence challenge.
The protections offered by the hearsay rule of exclusion best serve
the administrative law process by preserving the age-old standards of
reliability and relevance. Hearsay rule application could well pre-
serve the desired efficiency of the administrative process. To invite
the admission of all evidence regardless of its quality only delays the
adjudicative process. Additionally, the mere admission of untested ex-
trajudicial utterances only invites a disrespect for the process. The
total rejection of the hearsay rule within the administrative law pro-
cess does little toward ascertaining the truth and much to detract
from a just result.
35. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1971) (noting hearsay evidence
without rational probative force would be insufficient to alone support an admin-
istrative ruling, but permitting hearsay evidence in the form of medical reports to
support an administrative ruling because of the reliability and credibility of such
reports).
36. See Schwartz, supra note 17, §§ 4.3, 4.10, at 167-71, 189-92.
37. See Graham, supra note 18, at 190.
1999]
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Proponents of the administrative law process should not reject
modern hearsay rule revisions on the pretext that these proceedings
are significantly different in structure from general jurisdiction trial
practices. Administrative adjudications today are functionally
equivalent to civil nonjury trials, which do apply the Federal Rules of
Evidence. It necessarily follows that the codified Federal Rules, inclu-
sive of the hearsay provisions, should apply to modern administrative
adjudications: "The [rules of evidence] are logically applicable to the
admission of evidence at an administrative adjudication, since it is
now almost impossible to distinguish an administrative adjudication
from a civil, non-jury trial .... ."3
Administrative law traditionalists remain convinced that the hear-
say rule, despite its modern reforms, is overly exclusive and detracts
from the ascertainment of administrative truths. However, modern
courts have noted the inherent risks to the administrative truth find-
ing process when hearsay proofs are admitted without credibility
foundation. 3 9
Administrative litigators of today find it most difficult to predict
evidence law case rulings without uniform codes of evidence. The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act provides the litigator with little or no gui-
dance to proof offering other than standards of relevance and
materiality. The administrative law process would best be served by
adopting codes of evidence law similar to the Federal Rules of
Evidence.4O
Given that most administrative law courts and commentators ac-
cept the application of other technical rules of evidence, such as rele-
vance, foundation, privilege, and character evidence rules, to exclude
hearsay rule application alone remains a dubious practice. The appli-
cation of the modern hearsay rule of today would aid the administra-
tive law judge in decision-making responsibilities by excluding
problematic proofs, thereby advancing the integrity of administrative
decisions.
The administrative law process of today should no longer be en-
couraged to use an informal system when reviewing evidence offer-
ings, while continuing to profess adherence to a good faith process.
Given that administrative law judges might be perceived by the litiga-
tor as not having independent allegiance from their respective agen-
cies, adherence to the hearsay rule might well preserve the
independent integrity of the administrative process.
38. Id.
39. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 402, 407 (admitting hearsay evidence in the form of
medical reports, but noting the absence of live testimony and cross-examination);
Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 149 (holding hearsay could only constitute substantial evi-
dence if it has "probative value and bear[s] indicia of reliability").
40. See Graham, supra note 18, at 189.
[Vol. 78:135
HEARSAY RULE
Like its general jurisdiction counterpart, administrative law courts
have implicitly recognized the working exceptions and exclusions to
the hearsay rule though they protest the opposite. Select categories of
hearsay proofs are well documented within our court literature. Party
admissions,41 business records, 42 public records,43 and statements to
physicians 44 are all examples of current categorical exceptions or ex-
clusions to the hearsay rule that administrative law courts have
adopted to permit the admission of hearsay proofs while protecting the
inherent integrity of the administrative law process.
III. CONCLUSION
The application of technical evidence law principles, including the
hearsay rule, assures fairness of process within an administrative law
hearing. Though it is well recognized that the hallmark of adminis-
trative proceedings is their alleged informality, by informality we
ought not admit all hearsay evidence regardless of its reliability.
Given that the administrative law process is so entwined in our
social and economic fabric, and its dispute resolution mechanisms so
important, mandating technical evidence law application is required.
Such evidence law application will assure significant uniformity
among agency adjudication and provide an environment within which
litigants will feel secure in the dispute process. The wide open APA
standard of proof admission only invites the possibility of confusion
and unfairness. The Federal Rules of Evidence model best provides a
uniform application of evidence admission while preserving the notion
of exclusion for challenged proofs, particularly those of suspect
reliability.
The continued claim that the administrative law process is signifi-
cantly different from that of courts of general jurisdiction, and there-
fore evidence law application should vary, continues to be a critical
problem. The administrative application of technical evidence law ad-
mittedly increases the formality of the administrative process. Ad-
41. Similar to general jurisdiction decisions, party admissions are not considered
hearsay evidence, and therefore remain admissible in either general jurisdiction
or administrative tribunals, providing they are relevant, material, and are not
overwhelmingly prejudicial. Party admissions are excluded from the category of
hearsay on the theory that their admissibility into evidence is the result of the
adversary system rather than satisfaction of any of the conditions arguably
designed to'satisfy credibility claims. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2); John A. Stra-
horn, Jr., A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions (pt. 2), 85 U. PA.
L. REv. 564, 569-86 (1937).
42. See Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 240 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987).
43. See Juste v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 520 So. 2d 69 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
44. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
1999]
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ministrative law traditionalists continue to object to such
formalization and believe that such a change would challenge the ad-
ministrative principles of dispatch and flexibility. However, such an
observation is doubtful. By definition, an administrative law hearing
is formal in that it is adversarial. Administrative hearings must con-
tain the technical rules of evidence to assure credibility of offer and
due process.
Adherence to past pronouncements, without review, only invites a
process to continue without evaluation. While historic precedent is in-
sightful, the law ought not to be blinded by mere adherence to
precedent.
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
4 5
Proponents of the administrative law process must recognize that the
technical application of evidence law principles assures fairness in the
proceeding, while continuing in good faith to provide a viable alterna-
tive to general jurisdiction courts. The passage of years since the in-
ception of the administrative law process has gradually seen
institutional changes in the application of technical evidence law prin-
ciples, particularly the hearsay rule.
The administrative law process of today is complex and all inclu-
sive. Litigants ought to be protected from the admission of problem-
atic proofs. A justice system which condones the opposite is worthy of
significant criticism.
45. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
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